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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On January 26, 1987, the lower court granted the 
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing each of the 
counts of the Appellants' Complaint. On March 16, 1987, the 
lower court denied the Appellants' Motion for Order Vacating 
Ruling and Granting Oral Argument. Appellants are now only 
appealing certain portions of the Ruling dismissing the various 
causes of action in the Complaint. 
This is an appeal as of right from that ruling. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Appellants are bound by the factual record 
presented to the lower court or whether they may, on appeal, 
embellish that record by citing and misinterpreting testimony 
not previously presented to the lower court. 
2. Whether a loan which was for the speculative 
development of raw land and which three other banks refused to 
make is unconscionable when it had an effective annual interest 
rate of less than 25% and when it was fully secured by a trust 
deed and letters of credit. 
3. Whether Appellants can reform the contracts on the 
grounds of unconscionability when they accepted the benefits of 
it, governed themselves according to its provision for over 
eighteen months, and now bring suit to enforce it. 
4. Whether Appellants can reform the contracts on the 
grounds of unconscionability when the contracts were 
subsequently transferred to good faith purchasers. 
5. Whether Respondents were required to release 
security when forced to resort to other security to collect 
amounts due under the subject note. 
6. Whether Respondents are obligated to forfeit their 
contractual rights and privileges in order to satisfy the 
unilateral demands of the Appellants which seek actions and 
concessions not required by the contracts. 
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7. Whether this State recognizes a cause of action 
for tortious breach of an alleged implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, 
8. Whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing requires the Respondents to comply with additional 
terms and demands unilaterally dictated by the Appellants after 
the written contract has been executed and partially performed. 
9. Whether the lower court may consider (a) the 
Appellants' own admissions that a dispute existed as to whether 
any of the subject lots should be released under a subject 
trust deed; (b) the additional record cited to the court; and 
(c) common sense to determine whether the doctrines of 
compromise, modification and/or of accord and satisfaction bar 
the Appellants' claims. 
10. Whether Appellants can claim questions of fact 
existed on the issues of compromise, modification and/or of 
accord and satisfaction when they failed to cite any testimony 
to the lower court refuting such a contention despite the fact 
that the lower court specifically granted them an opportunity 
to do so. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellants (hereinafter "the Kays") filed their 
Complaint on or about February 12, 1986. (R.l to 16.) On 
October 6, 1986, Respondents moved for summary judgment 
dismissing the Complaint and filed a supporting memorandum, an 
appendix containing the cited deposition testimony and the 
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affidavit of Val E. Southwick. (R.390 to 473.) On or about 
October 16, 1987, the Kays filed a responsive memorandum and 
the affidavits of Lawrence Kay (R.498 to 506) and Robert L. Kay 
(R.523 to 531.) On or about October 29, 1987, Respondents 
filed their Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R.555 to 568.) On November 5, 1986, the 
lower court conducted a hearing on a discovery matter. During 
that hearing, the Kays' counsel requested an opportunity to 
submit an additional memorandum to the court regarding the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The court granted that request. 
(See R.1009 to 1012.) No additional memorandum, affidavits or 
record citations were provided by the Kays or their counsel. 
On January 27, 1987, the Honorable Richard C. Davidson granted 
the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Complaint. 
On or about February 18, 1987, Appellants moved to vacate the 
judgment (R.977.) Because of Judge Davidson's assignment to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, that motion was heard by the 
Honorable Boyd Bunnell, who denied the Motion for Order 
Vacating Ruling and Granting Oral Argument on March 18, 1987. 
(R.1097.) Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal on March 24, 
1987. (R.1101.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit is a result of the general decline of the 
oil and gas industry and the deleterious effects of that 
decline upon the economy of Vernal, Utah. If that economy had 
remained as robust as when the Kays began developing the Yellow 
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Hills subdivision (the property which is the subject of this 
lawsuit), then the lots in the subject subdivision may have 
sold, the obligations now owed to the respondent-assignees of 
the subject Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note ("the Investors") 
may have been paid according to the terms of the Trust Deed and 
Trust Deed Note, and this lawsuit would never have been filed. 
Unfortunately, the Vernal economy did not thrive, the 
Kays did not sell lots, and they defaulted on their payment 
obligations under the Note. When the Investors began pursuing 
their contractual remedies, the Kays filed their Complaint to 
delay the foreclosure of the Yellow Hills subdivision. 
The Kays were successful in maintaining possession of 
Yellow Hills without making any payments on the Note for over 
eighteen months. On or about January 27, 1987, however, the 
Honorable Richard C. Davidson granted the Respondents' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and dismissed each of the purported claims 
in the Complaint. He did so after carefully considering the 
memoranda of the parties and the record presented to him. At 
the Kays' counsel's request, Judge Davidson had even granted 
them the opportunity to submit further evidence to him after 
the normal briefing period, but they wholly failed to take 
advantage of that opportunity. 
On or about March 18, 1987, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
rejected the Appellants1 arguments that the decision should be 
reconsidered. 
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The Kays now come to this Court claiming that Judge 
Davidson and Judge Bunnell erred. In making these arguments, 
Appellants now rely upon testimony never presented to the lower 
court, and they rely upon testimony which is inherently 
illogical and refuted by their own testimony. Based upon the 
record before the lower court, and as a matter of law, the 
lower courts properly dismissed the Appellants' Complaint. 
They did so because the Kays defaulted on their contractual 
obligations; those contractual obligations were valid and 
enforceable; and the Respondents complied with all their 
contractual, statutory and common law duties. Accordingly, the 
decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Contrary to the narrative contained in the Kays' 
appellate brief, only the following facts were established 
before the lower court: 
1. In January 1983, appellant Robert Kay purchased 
the property encompassing the Yellow Hills subdivision for 
$350,000. (R.466.) 
2. The Kays subsequently applied for loans from First 
Security Bank, First Interstate Bank and Zions Bank to develop 
Yellow Hills into an improved subdivision, but all three banks 
declined to loan funds to the Kays for that purpose. (R.429.) 
3. In December 1983, the Kays applied for a 
development loan from respondent Summit Systems, Inc. 
("Summit"). (R.429; R.460.) After negotiations, the Kays 
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executed a Trust Deed Note for $806,000. (See Exhibit A to 
Complaint (R.l to 16), and Exh. B to Appellants' Brief). To 
secure the Trust Deed Note, the Kays executed a Trust Deed on 
most of the Yellow Hills subdivision. (See Exhibit B to 
Complaint (R.l to 16), and Exh. C to Appellants' Brief). Both 
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note were signed by each of the 
plaintiffs. (See R.438-439.) 
4. At the closing, $667,000 was actually disbursed to 
or for the benefit of the Kays. (R.498 and R.523; R.436; 
R.448; R.475.) If the Kays had made all payments required 
under the Note, they would have paid the equivalent of an 
annual percentage rate of approximately 23.13% to 24.28% on the 
funds disbursed. (R.476.) 
5. Unlike typical loan transactions, Summit, as 
lender, paid for all title abstracts, title insurance premiums, 
recording fees, escrow closing fees, loan origination fees, 
"points," and "finders fees." The Kays were not required to 
obtain additional "out-of-pocket" funds to close the loan. 
(See R.476.) 
6. From January to May 1984, and for valuable 
consideration, Summit assigned 100% of its interest in the 
Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to the investors who are named 
as defendants in this lawsuit. (R.477.) The investors issued 
a power of attorney to Summit to direct the trustee to execute 
deeds of partial reconveyance as may be required pursuant to 
the terms of the Trust Deed. (R.477.) 
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7. The first quarterly payment under the Trust Deed 
Note was due June 1, 1984. On or about June 19, 1984, the Kays 
made a payment of $48,737.72. (See R.452; R.478.) 
8. The Kays defaulted on their next quarterly payment 
of $42,659.37 due September 1, 1984. Accordingly, on or about 
October 2, 1984, the investors of the note called the letter of 
credit from First Security Bank for $110,000.00. (R.478.) 
That letter of credit was drawn upon after discussions with 
Robert Kay. (R.457.) The amounts received from the First 
Security letter of credit were applied to outstanding interest, 
penalties and principal. (R.478.) 
9. The Kays defaulted on their next payment of 
$42,659.37 due December 1, 1984. Accordingly, on or about 
January 4, 1985, the holders drew upon the two letters of 
credit from First Interstate Bank in the amount of 
$170,000.00. (R.478.) That amount was applied to outstanding 
interest, penalties and principal. 
10. The next payment of $42,659.37 was due March 1, 
1985. The Kays made the required payment of $44,792.34 
(including late fees and interest) on or about March 28, 1985. 
Id. That amount was applied to outstanding interest, late 
payment penalty and principal. (R.478.) 
11. The Kays defaulted on the payment due June 1, 
1985 in the amount of $42,659.37. (R.478.) 
12. On or about June 2, 1985, the Kays wrote Summit 
requesting release of seven lots. (See R.440; R.449.) 
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13. On or about June 3, 1985, Clive Sprouse offered 
to repurchase Yellow Hills from the Kays. (See R.441; R.450.) 
The Sprouse offer was conditioned upon seven lots being 
released and other actions being accomplished by June 24, 
1985. (R.441; R.450.) The June 24 date was proposed by the 
Kays. (R.464.) 
14. In response to requests from the Kays to reconvey 
the seven lots, Mr. Southwick attempted to contact the trustee, 
J. Scott Buehler, to authorize him to reconvey the seven lots 
identified in the June 2, 1985 letter. Mr. Buehler, though, 
was out-of-town on vacation. (R.477; R.420.) 
15. Mr. Southwick asked Vernal Abstract Company 
("Vernal Abstract") to act as substitute trustee to accomplish 
the reconveyance, but Vernal Abstract declined to act as 
substitute trustee. (R.477.) 
16. In late June 1985, Mr. Buehler returned from 
vacation, and on July 1, 1985, he executed the Deed of 
Reconveyance for the seven lots. (See R.478; R.489.) 
17. The Kays failed to make the payment due June 1, 
1985 and any further payments due under the Trust Deed Note. 
Accordingly, as of July 23, 1985, the Kays owed the holders of 
the note $621,378.71 in principal and accrued interest. 
(R.478.) Interest continued and continues to accrue on that 
amount at the rate of $277.36 per day. (R.478.) 
18. On or about July 29, 1985, Mr. Buehler filed a 
Notice of Default with the County Recorder because of the Kays1 
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failure to make the payments due under the Trust Deed Note. 
(R.422.) 
19. The Kays filed their Complaint against the 
defendants on or about March 25, 1986. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Summary of the Argument 
In January 1984, the Kays received $667,000.00 from 
Summit Systems, Inc. which they used to pay off existing 
obligations on the Yellow Hills subdivision and to further 
develop that property into an improved subdivision. The Kays 
signed a Note secured by letters of credit and a trust deed in 
favor of Summit Systems, Inc. 
For valuable consideration, Summit Systems, Inc. 
assigned 100% of its interests in the Note and Trust Deed to 
the Investors who were named as defendants in this lawsuit. 
The Kays made the first quarterly payment due under 
the Note, acquiesced in the calling of the letters of credit 
for the second and third quarterly payment, made the fourth 
quarterly payment and defaulted on any subsequent payment. 
Thus, they clearly accepted the benefits of their loan 
transactions and ratified those contractual obligations. Only 
after the Kays encountered further financial difficulties did 
they attempt to avoid those obligations by characterizing them 
as "unconscionable." 
As a matter of law, the Note and Trust Deed are not 
"unconscionable." The supposedly unconscionable substantive 
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terms to which the Kays object are substantially less onerous 
than other similar terms previously upheld by this Court. 
Similarly, as a matter of law, there is no basis for a claim of 
procedural unconscionability because no terms of the loan were 
buried in fine print, and Summit was not responsible for the 
Kays' perceived need to secure the loan. 
Further, even if a claim for unconscionability could 
have been made, that claim cannot be asserted against the 
Investors who are bona fide purchasers/assignees of the Trust 
Deed and Trust Deed Note. Finally, the Kays have waived any 
claim of unconscionability by ratifying the subject agreements 
when they accepted the benefits of that loan, attempted to 
comply with the loan provisions, and now seek enforcement of 
that contract. 
The Kays next contend that the Respondents failed to 
comply with certain release/reconveyance provisions of the 
Trust Deed. The Kays admit that they defaulted on making 
quarterly payments and that the Investors received payment by 
resorting to the letters of credit which had been provided as 
additional security for the loan obligations. The Kays 
contend, however, that the Investors were required not only to 
lose any further interests in the letters of credit, but also 
to voluntarily release their security interests in a 
significant number of lots which had also been provided as 
security. The Kays' argument ignores the very purpose of the 
Trust Deed and the letter of credit provisions in the Trust 
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Deed. That purpose was to provide Summit Systems, Inc. with 
the level of security and collateralization for the repayment 
of the loan which Summit Systems, Inc. deemed necessary to make 
the loan. The Kays ignore the clear language of the contract, 
seek to render other provisions of the Trust Deed meaningless, 
and ignore commercial reality. 
As a matter of law, the Respondents met all (a) 
express, implied, compromised and/or modified contractual 
obligation; (b) all statutory obligations which, by law, were 
incorporated into the contracts; and (c) all common law 
duties. Accordingly, the decision of the lower court 
dismissing the Kays' Complaint should be affirmed. 
II. The Kays May Not Cite And Rely Upon Evidence 
Which Was Never Presented To The Lower Court 
And Which Respondents Were Never Allowed To 
Address. 
Pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims in 
the plaintiffs* Complaint. The Motion was supported by 
numerous citations to deposition testimony and the affidavit of 
Val E. Southwick. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), the Kays could not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of their pleading. They were 
required to present affidavits and/or citations to other 
testimony in the record which contained admissible evidence and 
which raised issues of material fact. If they did not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate was properly entered 
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against them. See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044-45 (Utah 1983) ("Franklin Financial"); 
Rainford v. Ryttinq, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769, 770-71 
(1969). 
In their appellate brief, the Kays rely heavily upon 
deposition testimony of the Kays and others which was never 
presented to the lower court. Consequently, the Respondents 
were not allowed to cite additional deposition testimony or 
submit additional affidavits to address the Kays' new 
contentions. 
In the court below, the Kays only relied upon (a) the 
affidavits of Robert L. Kay (R.523 to 531) and Lawrence C. Kay 
(R.498 to 506); and (b) the deposition testimony of Lawrence C. 
Kay at p.90, line 14 to p.91, line 23, and of Robert L. Kay 
p.35, line 9 to p. 37, line 10. This was done despite the fact 
Judge Davidson gave them an opportunity to present additional 
evidence. It is improper for the Kays to now attempt to 
embellish the record and present new evidence for the first 
time on appeal. See Cowan & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 
695 P.2d 109, 113-14 (Utah 1984); Franklin Financial, 659 P.2d 
at 1045. 
Accordingly, the Kays' contentions on appeal will be 
argued based upon the record before the lower court. 
III. The Kays Breached Their Contractual Obligations. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Note, commencing June 1, 
1984, the Kays were obligated to make guarterly payments of at 
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least $42,659.37. From their own funds, they only made the 
June 1984 and May 1985 payments. As a result of the Kays' 
failure to make the quarterly payments due September 1, 1984 
and December 1, 1984, three letters of credit were drawn upon 
as provided in the Trust Deed. No payments have been made 
since May 1985. Thus, the Kays have clearly breached their 
contractual obligations. 
The only question presented on this appeal is whether 
the Kays have a legal excuse for those breaches. As set forth 
below, the Kays have no valid grounds for avoiding their 
contractual obligations. 
IV. The Trust Deed And Trust Deed Note Are Not 
Unconscionable. Accordingly, The Lower Court 
Correctly Ruled That The Subject Agreements 
Are Valid And Enforceable. 
Count I of the Kays' Complaint sought reformation of 
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to make them more "fair, 
reasonable, conscionable and enforceable." (R.10.) In answers 
to interrogatories (R.345-352) the Kays objected to the 
substantive terms of the agreements which provided for a 
"discount" of $139,000.00 and required them to obtain letters 
of credit as additional security for repayment of the funds 
which they received. They also contend that the agreements 
were procedurally unconscionable because they were in financial 
distress and were thus forced to accept onerous terms which 
differed from those which they thought would be included. 
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A, As a Matter of Law, the Substantive 
Terms of the Agreements Are "Conscionable". 
It is well-settled that in the absence of compelling 
considerations of policy to the contrary, it is the duty of the 
courts to give effect to the covenants to which the parties 
have agreed in their contracts. Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation 
of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339, 341 (1965). MA court 
does not have carte blanche to reform any transaction to 
include terms that it believes are fair." Briggs v. Liddell, 
699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah 1984). See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 
Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989, 990-91 (Utah 1958); Ephraim Theatre 
Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1958); 
Tooele City v. Settlement Canyon Irrigation Co., 4 Utah 2d 215, 
291 P.2d 881, 883 (Utah 1955). 
The case of Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 
(Utah 1983) ("Bekins Bar") is directly on point and 
demonstrates, as a matter of law, that the Kays' agreement with 
Summit is not unconscionable. In that case, the plaintiff, 
Bekins Bar V Ranch, was in desperate financial condition. To 
meet its financial obligations, the Ranch's president and his 
wife ("the Fains") borrowed $120,000.00 from the defendant 
Huths. 664 P.2d at 457. They agreed to repay $200,000.00 in 
annual installments of $100,000.00, $50,000.00, and 
$50,000.00. 1A. That was the eguivalent of an annual interest 
rate of 36.3 per cent. Id. The Fains later took out a second 
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loan for $80,000.00 from the Huths and agreed to repay 
$100,000.00 within six months — an effective annual interest 
rate of 5j^  percent! Id. The loans to the Fains were secured 
by a second .and third trust deed on the Fains* ranch, a 
security interest in farm equipment, three years of hay crops, 
and other personal property. Id. 
When the Fains defaulted on the payment of the loans, 
the Huths began foreclosure proceedings. The Fains sought 
preliminary injunctive relief, and, as have the Kays, claimed 
that they were not in default, that the notice of default had 
been improperly filed, and that the loans were "unconscionable.M 
The trial court agreed with the Fains and attempted to 
substantially modify the terms of the agreement. See 664 P.2d 
at 458-459. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and 
found that the trial court's attempts to make the agreements 
more "fair" were improper. It also ordered that the loan 
agreements be enforced as written. In doing so, the court made 
a number of observations which are pertinent to this case. 
First, the determination of whether a contract is 
unconscionable is to be made with respect to the conditions 
which existed at the time the contract was made. See 664 P.2d 
at 461. 
Second, the court noted that: 
The availability of high risk capital is 
essential to the functioning of our economic 
system. New enterprises with untested 
products often require high cost capital, as 
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do ventures whose viability is uncertain for 
whatever reason. Bekins argues that the 
finance charges on the loans, amounting to 
36.3 percent on the $200,000 loan and 58 
percent on the $100,000 loan, and the 
security taken for the loans, were 
excessive. Although the finance charges are 
high by some standards, we do not think they 
were unconscionable . . . . Huths• 
subsequent loans to Bekins, which proved 
necessary because of obvious underfinancing 
of the ranch operation, were clearly high 
risk. Acquisition of high risk capital 
almost always requires the payment of a 
premium. It is not sound legal policy to 
establish rules so strict as to 
unnecessarily dampen legitimate and 
desirable business activity. 
664 P.2d at 463. 
There is no doubt that the Kays agreed to pay a 
relatively high rate of interest for the money they obtained 
from Summit. The undisputed evidence demonstrated, however, 
that the Kays received a loan of $667,000.00 for a venture for 
which three different banks were unwilling to provide funds. 
They were able to obtain their high-risk venture loan with a 
longer repayment schedule than the banks would normally allow. 
They were not required to come up with loan origination fees, 
title reports, title insurance, or other out-of-pocket costs to 
obtain the loan. 
The Kays agreed to pay back their loan at an 
equivalent effective annual interest rate of approximately 
24.28%. That interest rate was much lower rate than the 36.3% 
and 58% interest rates held to be proper and enforceable in the 
two "discounted" loans in Bekins Bar. Thus, under Utah law, 
under circumstances analogous to the case at bar, the amount of 
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the "discount" to the plaintiffs and their agreement to repay 
the funded amounts with an annual effective interest rate less 
than 25% is not unconscionable. 
The Kays also claim it was unconscionable for Summit 
Systems to require them to provide letters of credit as 
security.l Not surprisingly, plaintiffs cite no authority 
for the novel contention that it is unconscionable for a lender 
to seek additional collateral for its loan. Indeed, in Bekins 
Bar the lender obtained security interests in hay crops, the 
debtors' properties, and several other items. In light of (a) 
the Kays' failure to make the September 1, 1984, December 1, 
1984, and June 1, 1985 payments, (b) the generally depressed 
state of the Vernal economy, and (c) the inherent risk 
associated with developing raw land into improved subdivision 
lots, Summit Systems was more than justified in seeking such 
additional security. 
xThe primary basis of this claim is that the loan was already 
fully collateralized since the property itself had an appraised 
value of $1,518,000.00. This perfectly illustrates how 
Respondents are prejudiced by Appellants' delinquent citation 
to deposition testimony never presented to the lower court. In 
fact, the appraisal which the Kays relied upon estimated the 
market value of fully improved lots. On its face, it did not 
reflect the value of the property at the time the loan was made 
to the Kays and the property was undeveloped. 
Similar arguments could be made regarding each of the Kays 
new factual assertions, e.g., they contend that Summit delayed 
the loan closing for several months, but the loan documents on 
their face, show that the letters of credit were not provided 
until less than two weeks before the closing. 
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B. There Are No Procedural Considerations 
Rendering the Subject Transactions 
Unconscionable. 
The Kays contend that the subject loan transaction was 
procedurally unconscionable because by the time the loan was 
closed, the Kays were in such desperate financial straits that 
they were forced to accept the unconscionable substantive 
terms. As a matter of law, this claim is without merit. 
To sustain a claim of "duress" or "compulsion," it 
must be proven that the Respondents wrongfully created the 
economic circumstances forcing the Kays to borrow funds from 
Summit. When a contract is otherwise entered into under stress 
of pecuniary necessity, it is not "compulsion." See Clearwater 
Constr. & Eng'r, Inc. v. Wickes Forest Indus., 108 Idaho 132, 
697 P.2d 1146, 1148-49 (1985) ("Clearwater"); Continental 
Illinois National Bank & Trusts Co. of Chicago v. Stanley, 60 6 
F.Supp. 558, 562 (N.D.I11. 1985); Sheraton Hawaii Corp. v. 
Poston, 454 P.2d 369, 372 (Haw. 1969); Chouinard v. Chouinard, 
568 F.2d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1978). 
The Kays found themselves in their alleged economic 
predicament from their own actions. The Respondents did not 
require the Kays to purchase and develop Yellow Hills. The 
Respondents did not force the three banks to turn down the 
Kays' loan requests. The Respondents did not prevent the Kays 
from negotiating with other lenders about obtaining development 
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loans at the same time they were negotiating with Summit 
Systems, Inc. The Respondents did not force the Kays to take 
$667,000.00. The Respondents did not prevent the Kays from 
seeking refinancing at more favorable terms at any time from 
another lender after the loan was entered into. As a matter of 
law, therefore, the supposed fact that the Kays were required 
to accept the financing because of their own economic situation 
is not grounds for reforming the contract on the grounds of 
unconscionability. 
Similarly, there are no other grounds for claiming 
"procedural" unconscionability. Usually, such a claim is based 
upon onerous terms being buried in "fine print." See 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company, 
Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985). In this case, the terms 
objected to were not buried. They were specifically set out in 
a separate typewritten documents — Schedule A to the Trust 
Deed and a closing statement showing the amount of the 
discount. It is undisputed that the Kays reviewed the loan 
documents at closing, and although they now claim those terms 
differed from alleged prior oral negotiations, they signed 
those loan documents knowing the amount they would be obligated 
to repay. Further, it is undisputed that no one prevented the 
Kays from seeking the advice of counsel or delaying the closing 
for a short period if they felt that was necessary. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the subject agreements were 
not procedurally or substantively unconscionable, and, thus, 
Count I of the Complaint was properly dismissed. 
C. The Kays May Not Reform The Contracts 
Because They Have Accepted The Benefits 
Of The Loan And Have Ratified It. 
Even assuming arguendo that the subject loan 
transaction was "unconscionable," such would make the contract 
"voidable," not void. See Clearwater, 697 P.2d at 1149; 
Hubbard v. Geare, 77 Ariz. 262, 269 P.2d 1064, 1065-66 (1954); 
State v. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647, 654 (Utah 1944). Such contracts 
can be adopted and ratified. An unconscionable contract is 
ratified when the party accepts the benefits of that contract 
and/or complies with its provisions. Id. 
The Kays accepted the benefits of the loan, i.e., they 
received $667,000.00. The Kays made at least two of four 
quarterly payments before defaulting or failing to make any 
further payments. They were consulted with and cooperated in 
the calling of the letters of credit as provided in the Trust 
Deed. They are now seeking enforcement of certain provisions 
of the Trust Deed which they claim the Respondents breached. 
They may not both seek to reform the contract and seek damages 
for its alleged breach. See Burley Newspapers, Inc. v. Mist. 
Publishing Co., 414 P.2d 460, 462-63 (Idaho 1966). Thus, the 
Kays have adopted the contract and ratified it. They are no 
longer entitled to reformation of the Trust Deed and Note on 
the grounds of unconscionability. 
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D. The Trust Deed And Note Cannot Be 
Reformed Because They Are Held By 
Bona Fide Purchasers. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Kays were entitled to 
reformation and that they had not ratified the contract, the 
Kays may not seek reformation against the Investors who 
collectively now hold 100% of the Trust Deed and Note. 
Contracts may not be reformed against good faith purchasers. 
See, e.g., Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan. 532, 438 P.2d 957, 967 
(1968), cited with approval in Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 
1271, 1273 (Utah 1984). It is undisputed that the Investors 
are bona fide, good faith purchasers who paid valuable 
consideration to acquire their interests in the Trust Deed and 
Note. 
V. The Respondents Were Under No Obligation To 
Release Lots When The Kays Had Defaulted On 
The Repayment Obligations, And The Respondents 
Were Forced To Seek Payment From Additional 
Security. 
The Kays1 second major contention is that the 
Respondents breached an express and implied contractual duty to 
reconvey lots from the Trust Deed when the principal amount of 
the loan was reduced by calling the letters of credit. This 
contention is without merit. 
The Kays agreed to repay $806,000, plus interest over 
the three year period of the loan. They agreed to fully 
collateralize that loan. To secure the loan, the Kays executed 
a Trust Deed on the Yellow Hills property. Ass additional 
security, the Kays provided three letters of credit in the 
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aggregate amount of $280,000 which could be called pursuant to 
the terms of paragraph 23 of the Trust Deed: 
23. Letter(s) of Credit. AJS additional 
security for the indebtedness the Trustor 
has delivered or shall deliver to the 
beneficiary the following irrevocable and 
unconditional letter(s) of credit drawn for 
the Trustor's account. 
Bank: First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. 
("The first bank") 
Letter of Credit Number: 062-060-8980-50005 
Amount: $110,000.00 
Expiration Date: July 10th 1985 
Bank: First Interstate Bank 
("The second bank") 
Letter of Credit Number: 2003 and 2004 
Amount: $130,000.00 (#2003) & $40,000.00 
(#2004) 
Expiration Date: Both July 10th 1985 
The beneficiary shall have the right to draw 
upon the letter(s) of credit or any renewal 
or extension thereof, in whole or in part, 
upon the occurrence of any one or more of 
the following events: 
(A)l. the occurrence of any event of 
default under this mortgage; 
(B) Proceeds of any draw upon the 
letter(s) of credit may be applied by the 
beneficiary to be a payment of accrued 
interest (including any accrued interest the 
payment of which was otherwise deferred), 
late charges, principal (including any 
pre-payment charge occasioned by a principal 
payment), or any other obligation arising 
out of the Trustor's obligation to the 
beneficiary under this Deed of Trust or the 
Trust Deed Note, in such manner as the 
beneficiary, in its sole discretion, deems 
appropriate. 
(C) Provided there is no default . . . 
the beneficiary shall release its rights in 
the letter(s) of credit and surrender the 
letter(s) of credit to the first and second 
bank upon the principal reduction of the 
Trust Deed Note as secured by this Deed of 
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Trust in the amount of Two Hundred Eighty 
Thousand ($280,000,00) Dollars. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Paragraph 23(C) expresses the parties* intent that 
security for the loan would be released when the principal 
balance had been reduced by $280,000.00. At that point, the 
$280,000.00 of letters of credit would be released as security, 
and the Investors would look solely to the property for 
security for remaining amounts due under the Note. 
The Kays' contention that the Investors were obligated 
to release their security interests in twelve lots when the 
Kays defaulted and the letters of credit drawn upon is 
purportedly based upon paragraph 22 of the Trust Deed. 
Paragraph 22 of the Trust Deed authorized partial 
releases of the Trust Deed if and when the Kays met their 
contractual obligations by making the required quarterly 
payments: 
22o Partial Releases. Upon receipt of the 
written request of the Trustor, and upon 
receipt of the principal payments 
hereinafter set forth, the beneficiary shall 
instruct the Trustee to deliver to the 
Trustor Deeds of Partial Reconveyance as 
follows: 
(a) Plat "A": Lots 1 through 27 excluding 
Lots 10, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
and 34 upon receipt of $15,000.00 for 
each lot to be so reconveyed. 
(b) Plat -A": Lots 35 through 95 upon 
receipt of $13,000.00 principal for 
each lot to be so reconveyed. 
(c) Plat "B": Lots 1 through 51 upon 
receipt of $5,000.00 principal for each 
lot to be so reconveyed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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It is axiomatic that when interpreting a contract, the 
court must consider each of its provisions in connection with 
the others and with a view towards the circumstances, nature 
and purpose of the transaction. Effect is to be given the 
entire agreement without ignoring any part thereof. See Jones 
v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980); Utah State Medical 
Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643, 646 
(Utah 1982); Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 
160, 163 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, paragraphs 22 and 23 must 
be read together in light of the nature of the transaction and 
the purpose of the Trust Deed and letters of credit which was 
to provide security for the loan. 
The Kays1 contention that they were entitled to lot 
releases when the letters of credit were drawn is clearly 
contrary to the intents and purposes of the Trust Deed 
provisions and is inherently illogical. The following 
hypothetical example illustrates this point: 
Borrower desires to develop 50 lots into 
an improved subdivision. He needs to borrow 
$100,000 to do so. The current appraised 
value of the lots are $1,000 each, $50,000 
total. Lender is willing to make a $100,000 
loan provided that Borrower secures the loan 
with the property as well as two letters of 
credit, one for $30,000 and one for 
$20,000. Thus, the $100,000 loan will be 
fully collateralized. Lender also agrees to 
release one lot for each $2,000 principal 
received. By the time Borrower pays 
$100,000, all the lots will be released. 
This is a typical loan arrangement. 
Borrower fails to make the first payment 
due on the loan so that the $30,000 letter 
of credit is drawn upon. Under the Kays1 
theory, the $30,000 should be credited to 
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principal leaving a balance of $70,000, 
They also contend that 15 lots should be 
released because the principal balance has 
been reduced. Thus, the remaining 
collateral would be 35 lots at $1,000 each 
and one $20,000 letter of credit. Instead 
of being fully collateralized, Lender is now 
owed $70,000, but now only has $55,000 worth 
of security (i.e., the $20,000 letter of 
credit and $35,000 in property). 
If Borrower missed the next payment so 
that the second $20,000 letter of credit was 
drawn upon, under the Kays' theory, an 
additional 10 lots should be released. 
Lender would now be owed $50,000, yet would 
only have a security interest in 25 lots for 
$25,000. This contention is inherently 
untenable and contrary to sound lending 
practices. 
While the Kay/Summit transaction is more complex than 
the illustration above, the principal is the same. The release 
provisions in the subject trust deed, read together with the 
letter of credit provisions establish that the parties intended 
that lots would be released when principal payments were 
received in. the normal course, not when received by resorting 
to other collateral. This is the only interpretation which 
makes commercial sense. Indeed, under the Kays* theory, the 
letters of credit would not be "additional security," but would 
be a principal source of payment. Under the Kays' theory 
paragraph 23(C) of the Trust Deed would be rendered 
meaningless, because security would be released before the Kays 
had reduced the principal balance of the loan by $280,000.00. 
The Kays argue that ambiguous contract provisions 
should be construed against the drafter. While that 
proposition of law is generally true, simply because parties 
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interpret language differently does not mean the contract is 
ambiguous. See Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 589 P.2d 
780, 782 (Utah 1979). Where, as here, the provisions of the 
contract can be reconciled to give effect to all those 
provisions, there is no ambiguity. See Camp v. Deseret Mutual 
Benefit Ass'n, 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Steel v. Eagle, 
207 Kan. 146, 483 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1971). As demonstrated 
above, paragraphs 22 and 23 can only be harmonized if 
interpreted to require lot releases if the principal balance 
was reduced by payments on the loan itself, not by collection 
of funds from additional security. 
The Kays cite deposition testimony wherein they 
contend Summit Systems, Inc. had agreed to release lots if 
letters of credit were drawn upon. That deposition testimony 
is inherently equivocal, and even if it were not, it would be 
inadmissible parol evidence which seeks to alter the terms of 
the written contract. See Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 
451 P.2d 769, 771 (1969); Steel v. Eagle, 207 Kan. 146, 483 
P.2d 1063, 1066 (1971). 
Based upon the foregoing, a construction of the 
agreement as a whole, in light of its purposes, and in order to 
give effect to all its provisions, indicates that the Kays were 
not entitled to any lot releases when the letters of credit 
were drawn upon. It would be error for this Court to rule 
otherwise. 
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VI. Respondents Complied With Their Contractual 
And Statutory Obligations In Reconveying Lots 
To The Kays. 
Although the Kays were not entitled to any lot 
releases under the Trust Deed when the letters of credit were 
called, Summit later agreed to release seven lots in order to 
facilitate the sale of the entire Yellow Hills subdivision to a 
third party. Indeed, such a sale would have been highly 
advantageous to Respondents because it would have triggered the 
due-on-sale clause of the Trust Deed (1fl4a) and provided for 
repayment of the loan. 
The Kays0 contention that the Respondents were 
obligated to reconvey the seven lots by June 24, 1985, however, 
is wholly without merit. 
On June 2, 1985, the Kays wrote Summit requesting the 
release of seven lots. Once such written notice was received, 
the Investors were required, by law, to advise the trustee to 
reconvey the property within thirty days after they received 
the written request from the Kays. See Utah Code Annotated 
§57-1-33 (1953). 
That statutory requirement was incorporated, by law, 
into the Trust Deed: 
It is the general rule that parties are 
presumed to contract with reference to 
existing statutes (citations omitted) and a 
statute which affects the subject matter of 
a contract is incorporated into and becomes 
a part thereof. (Citation omitted.) If the 
parties to the contract wish to provide for 
other legal principles to govern their 
contractual relationship, they must be 
expressly set forth in the contract. Absent 
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a clear intent to the contrary disclosed by 
the contract, the general law will govern. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Wash. 1980). See 
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 
649, 660 (1923) ("Laws which subsist at the time and place of 
the making of a contract . . . enter into and form a part of 
it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or 
incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike those 
laws which affect its construction and those which affect its 
enforcement or discharge.") This Court has consistently 
followed that general rule. See, e.g., George v. Oren Limited 
and Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1983); Beehive Medical 
Electronics Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d 53, 60 
(Utah 1978); Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538 
P.2d 301, 308 (Utah 1975). 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 (1953) was a 
statute in existence at the time the parties entered into the 
Trust Deed and specifically governs the imposition of liability 
upon a beneficiary under a trust deed for failure to request a 
timely release from the trustee. 
The undisputed facts clearly show that the Respondents 
complied with those statutory and contractual requirements. 
Within thirty days of the date Summit allegedly received the 
June 2, 1985 letter from the Kays, Mr. Southwick, on behalf of 
the Investors, requested the trustee, Mr. Buehler, to reconvey 
the seven lots. In fact, Mr. Buehler reconveyed the seven lots 
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on the thirtieth day (i,ew July 1, 1985), and the reconveyance 
was recorded July 3, 1985. 
Because the Respondents requested the trustee to 
reconvey the seven lots within thirty days of receipt of 
written request as required by statute, they satisfied all 
contractual and statutory obligations, 
VII. The Kays Stated No Claim For Tortious 
Breach Of Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith And Fair Dealing. 
Count IV of the Kays' Complaint sought recovery for "a 
tortious breach of [the Respondents'] implied covenants and 
duties of good faith and fair dealing." See paragraph 28 of 
the Complaint. (R.12 to 13.) (Emphasis added.) In Beck v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798-799 (Utah 1985), 
this Court rejected the contention that breach of an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to an 
independent tort action. The lower court, therefore, properly 
dismissed Count IV. 
On appeal, however, the Kays have apparently dropped 
their earlier contentions and now argue that the Respondents 
breached their implied contractual duties to release lots by 
June 24, 1985. This argument is without merit. 
The Kays are asking this Court to rule that the 
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing obligate 
parties to a contract to alter the express terms of the 
contract and the statutes which are incorporated therein in 
order to benefit one party. There is no such duty. In fact, 
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this Court has expressly recognized that where there are 
express terms concerning a specific contract right, there can 
be no claim for breach of an implied covenant of a different or 
contradictory nature. See Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 
P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, even if an implied covenant required the 
Respondents to act in good faith to aid the Kays in having 
seven lots available to Mr. Sprouse by June 24, 1985, then that 
obligation was clearly met. Summit Systems, Inc. made several 
good faith efforts to accomplish that reconveyance. It 
attempted to have the lots reconveyed by June 24, 1985, but was 
unable to do so because the trustee was out-of-town on 
vacation. It attempted to convince a title company to act as a 
substitute trustee to effect the reconveyance, but was 
unsuccessful. As soon as the trustee returned from vacation, 
the reconveyance was made. All of this was done within thirty 
days of the June 2, 1985 request for reconveyance. There is 
simply no legal or factual basis for the contention that the 
Respondents failed to act in good faith. 
VIII. The Lower Court Properly Ruled That A 
Dispute Had Arisen Regarding The Number 
Of Lots To Be Released; That The 
Kays Compromised Their Claim; And That 
There Was No Failure On The Part Of The 
Respondents With Respect To That 
Compromise, Modification And/Or 
Accord And Satisfaction. 
Faced with the realization that they have no cause of 
action for the Respondents' alleged failure to convey lots by 
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June 24, 1985, the Kays now argue that lots should have been 
released in response to a demand for the release of twelve lots 
allegedly made on January 10, 1985. 
As demonstrated in preceding sections, Respondents had 
no contractual or other duty to release any lots as a result of 
the calling of letters of credit. Thus, the Kays' argument is 
fatally flawed from its beginning. 
The lower court set forth other grounds for dismissing 
the Kays* claim that lots should have been released in response 
to the January 10, 1985 letter: 
Plaintiffs* claim . . . is based upon a 
letter dated January 10, 1985. Defendants 
claim the matter was compromised and a new 
letter was sent on June 2, 1985 demanding 
the release of seven (7) lots. There is no 
dispute that the seven (7) lots were 
released within thirty (30) days of that 
demand. 
The facts as admitted by both sides show 
the Plaintiffs making payments late or 
failing to make payments with the result 
that the "additional security" was 
utilized. There was a dispute whether lots 
could be released. The June 2, 1985 letter 
is an abandonment of the earlier and greater 
claim for releases and does constitute a 
compromise and the subsequent release 
constitutes an accord and satisfaction. The 
Court does not find a failure on the part of 
the Defendants . . . . 
The lower court rendered that decision based upon the 
following record: 
(1) The Kays demanded that twelve lots be released; 
(2) The Kays admitted Summit maintained that they were not 
entitled to any lot releases. Indeed, Respondents 
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have consistently maintained that position in 
correspondence between the parties, (see L. Kay depo. 
Exh. 18, R.452-454); in the litigation below, and on 
appeal. 
(3) In the Spring of 1986, the parties compromised and the 
Respondents agreed to release and the Kays agreed to 
accept seven lots. 
Parties to a contract are free to modify all or any 
portion of the terms of that contract, and any pre-modification 
contractual rights which conflict with the modified contracts 
are deemed waived or excused. See Rapp v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980); 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 89 (1963). 
Parties are free to compromise disputes. Parties are free to 
agree to substituted performance to constitute an accord and 
satisfaction. Whatever the name given to this principle, the 
fact is that the Kays agreed to accept seven lots without any 
change in any other contractual provision. 
Contrary to the Kays' arguments before this Court, 
there was clearly a dispute as to whether any lots should be 
released when the letters of credit were drawn. To resolve 
that dispute, in the Spring of 1985, the parties agreed to 
compromise on that single issue and release seven lots. The 
record presented to the lower court further indicates that not 
one additional term of the parties' obligations was altered by 
the parties. In fact, the June 2, 1985 letter indicated on its 
face that Mr. Southwick was insisting upon the Kays' compliance 
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with the contract terms by insisting that the request for 
release of lots be in writing. Accordingly, pursuant to their 
contractual and statutory obligations, the Investors were 
required to instruct the trustee to release those lots within 
thirty days of receipt of the Kays' June 2, 1985 written 
request. It is undisputed that they did so. 
The Kays strenuously objected to the presentation of 
the compromise/modification/accord and satisfaction argument on 
the grounds it had not been plead as an affirmative defense. 
Respondents were not barred from raising that theory. 
Prior to their Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Kays had never indicated that they 
were relying upon the January 10, 1985 letter as a basis of a 
claim against Respondents. The Complaint never mentioned it, 
nor did it appear in any other pleading. 
When presented with this new theory, Respondents 
raised the new defense, but it was a new defense in name only. 
Respondents had previously plead as affirmative defenses that 
the Kays had waived their claims and that the Respondents had 
met all their obligations under the agreements and 
understandings of the parties. (R.267.) If the Kays agreed to 
accept seven lots, such would constitute a waiver of their 
claim for twelve lots. If the parties agreed that Respondents 
were only to convey seven lots, then the Respondents had 
complied with that obligation. While the "magic words" — 
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accord and satisfaction — had not been plead, the Kays were 
put on notice of the Respondents' contentions. That is all 
that is required by the pleading requirements.2 See Cheney 
v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). 
Finally, this argument is a red-herring because the 
Kays were not prejudiced by the accord and satisfaction 
defense. The lower court specifically granted the Kays an 
opportunity to respond to the accord and satisfaction argument 
by submitting an additional memorandum and additional 
evidence. (R.1009-1012.) The Kays then failed to so respond. 
Based upon the undisputed facts before it, the lower 
court properly ruled that the parties had reached a compromise, 
had modified the contract, and/or had reached an accord and 
satisfaction which barred any claim that Respondents improperly 
failed to release lots in response to the January 10, 1985 
letter. 
CONCLUSION 
This is not a difficult or convoluted case. The Kays 
are attempting to avoid the consequences of their failure to 
make the Trust Deed Note payments. With this lawsuit, the Kays 
2Summit Systems, Inc. has maintained that it never received 
the alleged January 10, 1985 letter. (See R.564.) For the 
purposes of the motion for summary judgment, however, it argued 
as though that letter had been received. It would be anomalous 
to require Respondents to raise an affirmative defense based on 
correspondence which they never received. 
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have attempted to deny or delay the Investors the opportunity 
to recover the funds they invested on the basis of the Trust 
Deed and Trust Deed Note which the Kays freely executed. 
The arguments presented by the Kays regarding 
"unconscionability" and the Respondents' alleged breach of 
contract are without merit. 
With respect to the claim of unconscionability, the 
terms of the Trust Deed which are now in question were set 
forth in a separate typewritten sheet and were discussed at 
closing. Under Utah law, the terms which are now contested by 
the Kays are not unconscionable. The Respondents were not 
responsible for the Kays' perceived need to execute the loan 
contracts. The Kays subsequently ratified that contract. 
Finally, it is too late to "reform" the contract terms against 
the Respondent-Investors. 
Nor is there any basis for the Kays' claims that 
Respondents breached the agreements by failing to timely 
release lots. The June 2, 1985 letter is the written 
communication upon which the Kays must base their claim. It is 
clear that the Respondents complied with any contractual and 
statutory duties with respect to lot releases after that letter 
was received. It is unfortunate that the trustee was on 
vacation prior to June 24, 1985, when the Kays wanted the lots 
released. The fact that Respondents were unable to reconvey 
the lots sooner than the contract and statute required, 
however, does not give rise to a breach of contract claim, 
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particularly when the Respondents were not only able to request 
the trustee to reconvey the lots within thirty days of the 
written request as required by U.C.A. §57-1-33 (1953), but more 
importantly, were actually able to reconvey the lots on the 
thirtieth day. 
Based upon the foregoing, the summary judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 1987. 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, 
WILCOX & BENDINGER 
500 Kearns Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF were mailed, first-class postage prepaid, 
this 18th day of November, 1987, to the following: 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
4299m f —A 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A - Ruling 
Exhibit B - Trust Deed Note 
Exhibit C - Trust Deed 
Exhibit D - Utah Code Annotated §57-1-33 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAWRENCE C. KAY, JOY KAY, 
ROBERT L. KAY, and TERESA KAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT SYSTEMS, INC., a 
corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
R U L I N G 
C i v i l N o . 86-CV-48U 
The parties willingly entered into negotiations over the loan. 
The final terms were well understood by all and were specifically 
agreed to by Plaintiffs. Count I is hereby dismissed with pre-
judice. 
The Court is not persuaded that a beneficiary of an agreement 
owes any fiduciary duty to the Trustor. Plaintiff has cited no 
authority to the contrary. Count III is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
This Court will not recognize a cause of action for tortious 
breach of implied covenant and fair dealing. Court IV is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
The Court having dismissed Counts III and IV finds nothing to 
sustain Plaintiffs' Claim for punitive damages. Count VIII is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
EXHIBIT A /w 
The remaining Counts, II, V, VI and VII, are dependant upon 
Plaintiffs1 claim of wrongful refusal to release lots. Plain-
tiffs1 claim this is based upon a letter dated January 10, 1985. 
Defendants claim the matter was compromised and a new letter was 
sent on June 2, 1985 demanding the release of seven (7) lots. 
There is no dispute that the seven (7) lots were released within 
thirty (30) days of that demand. 
The facts as admitted by both sides show the Plaintiffs 
making payments late or failing to make payments with the result 
that the "additional security" was utilized. There was a dispute 
whether lots could be released. The June 2, 1985 letter is an 
abandonment of the earlier and greater claim for releases and does 
constitute a compromise and the subsequent release constitutes an 
accord and satisfaction. The Court does not find a failure on the 
part of the Defendants. Counts II, V, VI and VII are also 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Richard W. Giauque 
Ray G. Martineau 
Robert M. Anderson 
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TRUST DEED NOTE 
$806,000.00 _ - -ah January X3'U\ I 
For value received, we, or any of us, promise to pay to SUM 
SYSTEMS, INC. or order, at its above office in Utah, the principal 
Eight Hundred Six Thousand Doll ars ($806,000,00) with interest ther 
from January 2i5Mi' , 1984 until paid at the rate of SEVENTEEN (177.) perc 
per annum, both principal and interest payable only in lawful money 
the United States of America. 
This Note evidences a loan made or to be made by SUMMIT SYSTE 
INC. to Borrower in the principal amount hereof and is secured by 
Trust Deed or even date herewith. This note is calculated on a da 
interest basis. 
It is understood and agreed, Chat the first installment of 
accured interest shall be due on the 1st day of June, 1984. Then, subseq 
installments in the amount of ($42,659.37) Forty Two Thousand Six Hund 
Fifty Nine and 37/100's dollars, including interest, shall be due 
the 1st day of September 1984, and one of said installments to be p 
on the 1st day of each and every quarter thereafter until the 1st 
of December, 1987, at which time the whole of the unpaid princip 
together with accrued interest, shall be due; each of said quarte 
installments to be applied first to the payment of accrued inter 
on the unpaid balance, and the balance thereof to be credited on s 
principal. 
And in case default be made in the .payment of any of said installme 
of principal or interest at the times and in the manner aforesaid, t! 
such installment or payment, installments, or payments, so in defau 
shall be added to and become a part of the principal sum, and from 
date when each installment should have been paid until it is paid 
shall bear twenty one percent rate of interest as the principal de; 
or in the performance of any agreement, covenant or condition in 
Trust Deed securing this note, the holder thereof, at its option, , 
without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance . 
accrued interest due and payable. 
In Che event any installment of principal and interest shall rem; 
unpaid for a period of 15 days after due, Che undersigned, at the opt: 
of Che holder hereof and upon demand, agree to pay as a late chai 
a sum equivalent to FIVE (57.) percent of the principal amount of si 
installment. Default is defined as 15 days late on any payment. 
If this note be placed for collection, either with or without sui 
the undersigned jointly and severally agree Co pay all costs and expen* 
thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, guarantors and endorsers hereby severally tfaive presenting 
for payment, demand, notice of dishonor, protest and of non-payme 
of chis note, and all defenses on the ground of any extension of ti 
of payment that may be given by the holder to them or any of them; < 
also agree that further payments of principal or interest in renev 
Chereof shaLl not release them as makers, guarantors or endorsers. 
In the event the undersigned is unable to pay off the outstandi 
principal and interest due on 12-1-87 due solely to external financ: 
conditions affecting this and like property generally, then and oi 
Chen will the lender extend the term for two more years with the follow: 
conditions strictly met; (1) A 47. modification fee of the outstand: 
balance paid at the time of modification: (2) The quarterly paym< 
will increase so as to amortize fully the 'outstanding balance due 
12-1-87 over the Cwo year period ending 12-1-89 at the same rate 
interest set forth in Che note secured hereby: (3) To verify the existem 
of Che above mentioned external financial conditions and market condici. 
Che Borrower will submit zz the Lender uritter. -verification that 
Borrower has been denied re-financing by Chree commercial banks soL, 
because of adverse financial condicions and market conditions genera 
affecting Chis and like oCher property. 
La wr e vfc e_ KayV 
•^l^i ;( J'u 
/ Joy Kay/ / e r e s a ^ LA" 
EXHIBIT B S0000215 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
c •*- c, I Cfo f f lq T ' A V HO. ^jZQz&L- RaoorcM at r»guftdof iJt-J/uL (j.L<t\i^ * e r>*1 J & . S 
.Uintah Coofi^G^"; 
4 590,. Ha rrl s.on...BlM ?E^:..™"* '" ^ S°0k ^ ^ "'^ ^ 
Pgden.,.. Utah 84403 Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this ...J?J.*L. day of January. , 19.8.4. 
between Lawr.enc.e...C Kay. and Joy...Kay. 
Rohe.rt:..L.....Kay and Teresa .Kay , as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is 1940..East. .250Q..Sauth Naples Utah 84078 ' 
(Str*rt »nd numWr) (City) (S l tU) 
J-...Scptt..Buehler ,
 RS TRUSTEE,* and 
.....Summit-.Sy.s.teiDS..Inc.. , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in . U i n t a h 
County, State of Utah: 
''Lots 1 through 95 inclusive of Plat "AM YELLOW HILL ESTATES 
SUBDIVISION, excluding Lots 10, 20 & 28-34. Lots 1 through 
51 inclusive of Plat rtB" YELLOW HILL ESTATES SUBDIVISION, 
being located in the West half of Section 18, Township 4 South, 
Range 21 East, Salt Lake meridan. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 8 0 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
"NOTE: Trustee must he a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, buildine and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah, a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah, or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
EXHIBIT C p 1 0 0 0 0 5 2 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY 0~ THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES 30 L 
1: T o keep said property in go.... condition and repair; not to remove or drr ,sh any building thereon, to 
complete or restore promptl) and in good and workmanlike, manner any building wlmli may be constructed 
damaged or destroyed thereon, to comply with all l a * v cuvrn.inN an<l restrictions .iffet hng ••»*•'' pfoprrlv . not 
to commit nr permit uasie therrof. not lu lummil, suffer or permit an> ait upon said property in v i«.I.ili..n of lav*, tr. 
do all other arts which fn.ni the character or use of said property mav be reason.ibl\ necess^rv. the specific 
enumerations herein nut excluding the general, and. »f the loan si•<-tired hereby or a m part lli»-r«-«»f is being ..!» 
Lamed fur tbo purpose of financing Construction of improvements tin said property. Trustor lurther agrees: 
(a) To enmmenee construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence t«» completion 
in accordance with plans and s |xufications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all turns during construction 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authori/.i-d to accept as true and conclusive all facts and state 
menLs therein, and lu act thereon hereunder. 
2. T o provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amount'; as Beneficiary may require, on 
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed tin said properi* Sot b insurance skil l be carried 
in companies approved bv Benefici.irv v*ith loss payable clauses in favor ol and in tnrm ai i tpl . ible to llciu-ficiarv 
In event of loss. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may tn.ik. prool of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment' (or >m h loss dirinily lu B. nefuiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiarv jointly, and the insurance prm«t tis. or nn> part thereof. ma\ be applied 
by Beneficiarv. at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair ol 
the property damaged 
3. T o deliver to. pav for and maintain with Benefit iary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of \itl»« a* Beneficiary may require, including abstract* ol title or policies ol ink- insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs ami expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said properly, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessment*, and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property, to pay. when due. all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to bv prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs. 
fees, and expenses of this Trust. 
6 Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto, and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable Ives. 
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent ( lO r t ) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
I T IS M U T U A L L Y A G R E E D T H A T : 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear m and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro 
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds uncluding the proceeds of any policies of fire and Olb^r insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorneys fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof, (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto', and the n-> itals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Tiustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional necurity. Trustor hereby assigns Benefit iary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have thi right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to t im- to c o l l e t any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right. power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Ber.eficiary t collect, shall be. or be construed to 
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
•ubordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, lesa 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Benef;uary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right, hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of auch right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
14 Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such defauk. Beneficiarv may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default anrt of election t o cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof LS situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
l*»a Due on S a l e . The loan ev idenced by the note secured hereby was i a d e in r e l i a n c e upon Trustor 
c r e d i t and f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y and property aaaageaent e x p e r t i s e . A c c o r d i n g l y , in the event the Trustor or 
s u c c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t s h a l l e i t h e r s e l l , convey or a l i e n a t e the here in d e s c r i b e d property or any part t h e n 
i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n without the w r i t t e n p e r a i s s i o n of lender or be d i v e s t e d of t i t l e in any aaner , whether voh 
or i n v o l u o t i r i l v . then the f u l l p r i n c i p a l of the Note secured hereby t o o a t h e r * i t h f u l l *nd -ill other aioun! 
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rr s a id n o t e , t h i s Deed of Trust r t the op t ion of the h o l d e r , without deaand and n o t i c e , s h a l l immediately Lccoi 
and p a y a b l e . B e n e f i c a r y ' s w r i t t e n consent s h a l l not be unreasonably w i t h h e l d . 
15 After the lap»* of auch tin * may then be required by law following t, ecordation of laid notice of 
default aiid notice ol default and notice of tale having been given as then required by law, Tius lre , without dNnand *^fl 
on Trustor ahall sell aaid property on the dale and at the time and place drsignat?d in **id nonce of »nle. either as U\ > 
a whole or in separate parceli. and in tuch order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trusior to 
direct the order in which auch property, if consisting of aeveral known lots or parcels, shall be told) , at public 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchaae price payable in lawful money of the United States at the time of 
%Jl^e The person conducting the aale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the tale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and. in every case, notice of postponement *hall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale, provided, if the sale is postponed 
for longer than one day beyond the d*y designated in the notice of aale. notice thereof shall be given in the 
sjune manner at the original notice of tale. Truitee ah all execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property to told, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facta shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof Any person, including Bene 
ficiary. may bid at the tale. Trustee ahaJI apply the proceeds o( the tale to payment o( (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the aale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with auch aale and revenue stamps on T r u s t e e ! Deed; 
(3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at I0r4 per annum from date 
of expenditure. (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any. to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16 Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder. Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all turns 
aecured, hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which aaid property or tome part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such aubstitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatee*, 
devise-es. adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and 
several The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trust-e. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according: to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requeats that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
2 1 a . Personal L i a b i l i t y . Trustor and i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t n e r s s h a l l p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e for a l l aaounts 
due under the loan secured h e r e b y . In the event of a d e f a u l t due hereunder or the Note or r e l a t e d 
S e c u r i t y I n s t r u a e n t s , Benef i cary s h a l l have the r i g h t to proceed d i r e c t l y and i a a e d i a t e l y a g a i n s t Trustor 
and/or i t s c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t n e r s wi thout f i r s t proceeding a g a i n s t the property through f o r e c l o s u r e or 
o t h e r w i s e and such proceed ing i s not to be deeaed an i r r e v o c a b l e e l e c t i o n of r e a e d i e s . 
21b . Due on Encuabcrancc. Trustor covenants during the t e n hereof not to encuaber , a o r t g a g e , p ledge 
or hypothecate the property as s e c u r i t y for a d d i t i o n a l j u n i o r debt wi thout w r i t t e n consent of the benef icar 
and a breach of t h i s covenant Sha l l e n t i t l e l e n d e r , at i t s s o l e o p t i o n , to d e c l a r e the e n t i r e outs tanding 
p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t due and payable in f u l l with out deiand or n o t i c e . 
2 2 £ 2 3 ( S e e S c h e d u l e a ) SIGNATURE OF TRUSTOR 
v > -
5     d-  1 e  ) P -y 
revKayV Rot Lawrencfe^ k bert L 
Y%h J±L^ (If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UINTAH 
\ r 
On the .23rd day of January- A D - 19-84... personally 
QL\Jbu!Mttim 
^- Notary Public residing at: 
appeared before me .]tawrence_C,,..K^^ , 
the^igner(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .t.hey... executed the 
. * a m « \ •• C ,. 'j-. ^ 
V 
otary Public residing 
:
 My-1 Commission Expires: 
• \ o L b e r ^ , , i985 Vernal,.. Utah 
'-y.m ° .:.• \ . •'/"•/ (If Trustor a Corporation) 
ST'ATE OF OTAH 
COUNTY OF 8S* 
On the day of , A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me
 % who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
P10000!^1 
SCHEDULE A 303 
22. Partial Releases. Upon receipt of the 
written request of the Trustor, and upon receipt of 
the principal payments hereinafter set forth, the bene-
ficiary shall instruct the Trustee to deliver to the 
Trustor Deeds of Partial Reconveyance as follows: 
(a) Plat nAM: Lots 1 through 27 excluding 
Lots 10, 20, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 34 upon receipt 
of $15,000.00 for each lot to be so reconveyed. 
(b) Plat "A": Lots 35 through 95 upon receipt 
of $13,000.00 principal' for each lot to be so reconveyed. 
(c) Plat "B": Lots 1 through 51 upon receipt 
of $5,000.00 principal for each lot to be so reconveyed. 
23. Letter (s) of Credit. As additional security 
for the indebtedness the Trustor has delivered or shall 
deliver to the beneficiary the following irrevocable 
and unconditional letter(s) of credit drawn for the 
Trustor's account: 
Bank: First Security Bank of Utah N.A. 
("The first bank") 
Letter of Credit Number:062-060-8980-50005 
Amount: $110,000.00 
Expiration Date: July 10th 1985 
Bank: First Interstate Bank 
. ("The second bank") 
Letter of Credit Number: 2003 and 2004 
Amount:$130,000.00 (#2003) & $40,000.00 (#2004) 
Expiration Date: Both July 10th 1985 
The beneficiary shall have the right to draw upon the 
letter(s) of credit or any renewal or extension thereof, 
in whole - or in part, upon the occurance of any one 
or more of the following events: 
(A) 
1. the occurance of any event of default under 
this mortgage; or 
2. The Trustor's failure to deliver to the 
beneficiary, no less than thirty (30) days prior to 
the expiration date of the letter(s) of credit or any 
renewal or extension thereof, a renewal or extension 
of the letter(s) of credit for a term of not less than 
one year; or 
3. Any action by the Trustor or the first or 
second bank which, in the beneficiary's discretion, 
reasonably exercised, may jeopardize its rights to 
draw on the letter(s) of credit; 
(B) Proceeds of any draw upon the letter(s) 
of credit may be applied by the beneficiary to be a 
payment of accrued interest (including any accrued 
interest the payment of which was otherwise deferred), 
late charges, principal (including any pre-payment 
charge occasioned by a principal payment), or any other 
obligation arising out of the Trustor's obligation 
to the beneficiary under this Deed of Trust or the 
Trust Deed Note, in such manner as the beneficiary, 
in its sole discretion, deems appropriate. 
(C) Provided there is no default or condition 
which but for the furnishing of notice or the passage 
of time would constitute an event of default under 
this Trust Deed, the beneficiary shall release its 
rights in the letter(s) of credit and surrender the 
letter(s) of credit to the first and second bank upon 
the principal reduction of the Trust Deed Note as secured 
by this Deed of Trust in the amount of Two Hundred 
Eighty Thousand ($280,000.00) Dollars. 
PlfMDOCSji 
57-1-33. Real Estate UTAH CODE 1987-1988 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust 
deed was given as security, and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, 
the amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the property 
sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the inde-
btedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the 
fair market value of the property as of the date of 
the sale. In any action brought under this section, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in brin-
ging an action under this section. 1985 
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by 
trust deed - Reconveyance of trust property. 
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has 
been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request 
by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property. The 
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as 
"the person or persons entitled thereto." The bene-
ficiary under such trust deed shall deliver to the 
trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and 
the note or other evidence of the obligation so sati-
sfied. Any beneficiary under such trust deed who 
refuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee 
for a period of thirty days after written demand 
therefor is made by the trustor or his successor in 
interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor 
in interest, as the case may be, for double damages 
resulting from such refusal, or such trustor or his 
successor in interest may bring an action against the 
beneficiary and trustee to compel a reconveyance of 
the trust property and in such action the judgment 
of the court shall be that the trustee reconvey the 
trust property and that the beneficiary pay to the 
trustor, or his successor in interest, as the case may 
be, the costs of suit including a reasonable atto-
rney's fee and all damages resulting from the 
refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance 
as hereinabove provided. i%i 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee -
Foreclosure of trust deed - Limitation of 
actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed 
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed 
as "provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages 
on real property shall be commenced, within the 
period prescribed by law for the commencement of 
an action on the obligation secured by the trust 
deed. i%i 
57-1-35. Trust deeds - Transfer of debts secured 
by - Transfer of security. 
The transfer of any debt secured by a trust deed 
shall operate as a transfer of the security therefor. 
1961 
57-1-36. Trust deeds - Instruments entitled to be 
recorded - Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment 
of a beneficial interest under a trust deed, notice of 
default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust 
property and any instrument by which any trust 
deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, when 
acknowledged as provided by law, shall be entitled 
to be recorded, and shall, from the time of filing the 
same with the recorder for record, impart notice of 
the contents thereof to all persons, including subs-
equent purchasers and encumbrancers for value, 
except that the recording of an assignment of a 
18 For Annotations, consult 
E X H I B I T D 
beneficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself 
be deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor, 
his heirs or personal representatives, so as to inval-
idate any payment made by them, or any of them, 
to the person holding the note, bond or other inst-
rument evidencing the obligation by the trust deed. 
1961 
Chapter 2. Acknowledgements 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving 
conveyances. 
57-2-2. Who authorized to take acknowledgments. 
57-2-3. Acknowledgment by deputy. 
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with United 
States armed forces. 
57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment. 
57-2-6. Party must be known or identified. 
57-2-7. Form of certificate of acknowledgment. 
57-2-8. When grantor unknown to officer. 
57-2-9. When executed by attorney in fact. 
57-2-10. Proof of execution - How made. 
57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified. 
57-2-12. What must be proven. 
57-2-13. Form of certificate. 
57-2-14. When subscribing witness dead - Proof of 
handwriting. 
57-2-15. What evidence required. 
57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness. 
57-2-17. Disobedience - Contempt • Proof aliunde. 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving 
conveyances. 
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real 
estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be ack-
nowledged or proved and certified in the manner 
hereinafter provided. 1953 
57-2-2. Who authorized to take 
acknowledgments. 
The proof or acknowledgment of every convey-
ance whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be 
affected shall be taken by one of the following off-
icers: 
(1) if acknowledged or proved within this state, by 
(a) a judge or clerk of a court having a seal, (b) a 
notary public, or (c) a county clerk or county reco-
rder; 
(2) if acknowledged or proved outside of this state 
and within any state or territory of the United 
States, by (a) a judge or clerk of any court of the 
United States, or of any state or territory, having a 
seal, (b) a notary public, or (c) a commissioner 
appointed by the governor of this state for that 
purpose; 
(3) if acknowledged or proved outside of the 
United States, by (a) a judge or clerk of any court 
of any state, kingdom, or empire having a seal, (b) 
any notary public of that state, kingdom, or empire, 
or (c) any ambassador, minister, commissioner, 
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the 
United States appointed to reside in that state, 
kingdom, or empire. 19*7 
57-2-3. Acknowledgment by deputy. 
When any of the officers above mentioned are 
authorized by law to appoint a deputy, such ackn-
owledgment or proof may be taken by any such 
deputy in the name of his principal. 1953 
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with 
United States armed forces. 
In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments 
in the manner and form and as otherwise authorized 
by this chapter, any person serving in or with the 
armed forces of the United States may acknowledge 
the same wherever located before any commissioned 
• Co's Annotation Service 
